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A Critical Examination of the Current Framework for Public Employees' Speech Rights: Is
Social Media Speech Taking Us Back to the Holmesian Era ofSpeech Protection?

By: Jinkal Pujara

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has long recognized the duel fundamental purpose of the first
amendment's freedom of speech protection.' Freedom of speech allows for diffusion of
information indispensable to the discovery of political truth. 2 It also protects individual
autonomy and self-expression. 3 This constitutional liberty gives citizens the freedom to speak
their mind and express their opinions on matters important to them. 4 Social media offers citizens
yet another method of expressing themselves and the ability to digitally communicate with users
globally within a matter of seconds. 5
Social media refers to the numerous internet based websites and platforms that enhance
information sharing and communication 6 This includes blogs, social networking websites, and
virtual worlds 7 Popular social media outlets such as Facebook8, Linkedln, Tumblr, Twitter9 and
1See. e.g. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980).
See id. at 538.
3
See id. at 537.
2

4

See id.
See T. Noble Foster and Christopher R. Greene, Legal Issues of Online Social Networks and the Workplace. 18 J.L.
BUS. &ETII. 131, 132 (2012).
6 See SOCIAL MEDIA DEFINED, http://www.socialmediadefined.com/what-is-social-media/ (last visited Apr. 30,
2013).
7
Galit Kiercut, Recent Developments in Employment Law and the Impact a/Technology on Workplace Trends, in
COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS, 2011 EDITION, LEADING LAWYERS ON ANALYZING LEGISLATION
AND ADAPTING TO TilE CHANGING STATE OF EMPLOYMENT LAW, available at 2011 WL 4452119 (Aug. 2011).
8
WHATIS FACEBOOK?, http://www.wisegeek.org/what-is-facebook.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). Facebook is a
social media networking website that lets users create a profile page containing the following sections: information
about the user, status, list of friends, photos, groups and a wall. Users can become "friends" with other Facebook
users, which allows users to view each other's profiles. Users can share photos, status updates, news stories, videos
and other content with their friends or the public, based on the privacy setting selected for content displayed on the
frofile. Users can also write personal notes on other user's wall and tag them in statuses, videos and photos.
TWITTER, https://twitter.com/about (last visited Apr. 30, 2013). "Twitter is a real-time information network that
connects you to the latest stories, ideas, opinions and news about what you find interesting."
5
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Y outube collectively have billions of users. 10 Social media makes it possible for ordinary people
to broadcast and share information with virtually anyone, with minimal effort. 11 It is the digital
"word of mouth" with exponential reach and plays a significant role in everyday life. 12
Social media is a substantial medium for speech as internet users in the United States
spend 906,000,000 hours per month on social media websites and blogs as indicated by a recent
nationwide report. 13 Social media outlets are utilized not only by citizens but also businesses, and
government entities to express ideas during prominent events and for marketing purposes. 14
Social media websites played a noteworthy role in the 2008 presidential election 15 and were also
used to communicate to hundreds during Hurricane Sandy and the Boston Marathon tragedy. 16
On a whole, online social media websites are another way for citizens to exercise their first
amendment rights, whether by way of expressing opinions, or engaging in debate and advocating
for ideals that they care about. 17
The advent of social media presents trivial issues in the legal community, especially with
regards to the employer-employee relationship in the public sector. 18 The first amendment
affords government employees some form of recourse when their employers take adverse action

10
Kiercut, supra note 2; Top 10 Social Networking Websites, DISCOVERY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2012, available at
http://news.discovery.com/tech/apps/top-ten-social-networking-sites.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).
!I Randy L. Dryer, Advising Your Clients (and You!) in the New World ofSocial Media: What Every Lawyer Should
Know About Twitter. Facebook. Youtube. & Wilds, UTAH B.J., May/June 2010, at 16.
12
Dryer, supra note 11.
__ ------------~oster_and_Greene,--supr...a-note-5-.
14
See, e.g., Foster and Greene, supra note 5.
15
Brief for Facebook as Amicus Curiae supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants Daniel Ray Carter, Jr. and In Support of
Vacatur, Bland v. Roberts, 857 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2012) (No. 12-1671) at *18 (citing, JaneS. Schacter,
Digitally Democratizing Congress? Technology and Political Accountability, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 641, 659 & n.79
(2009)).
16
PEJ New Media Index: Hurricane Sandy and Tlvitter, PEW RESEARCH CENTER'S PROJECT FOR EXCELLENCE IN
JoURNALISM, http://www.joumalism.org/index_report/hurricane_sandy_and_twitter (last visited Apr. 30, 20!3);
Twitter Profile of the Boston Police Department, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Boston_police_(last updated Apr. 30,
2013 9:13AM).
17
Brief for Facebook, supra note 15, at 7.
18
See, e.g., Foster and Greene, supra note 5.
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on the basis of their speech. 19 However, these speech protections are increasingly narrow with
respect to public employees' off-duty social media speech. 20 This paper addresses the nature of
first amendment speech protection a govermnent employee has in the context of off-duty social
media based speech that is unrelated to employment. I argue that the current legal framework
defining the contours of first amendment speech protection for govermnent employees weigh
heavily towards employer discretion and are insufficient to address the ubiquitous use of social
media as a basis for expression and mass communication. 21 Accordingly, I argue for a
modification of the current framework to appropriately account for employees' interest in offduty speech. 22 To rectify, I advocate for a framework under which govermnent employers cannot
take adverse employment action based on the content of off-duty social media speech that is
unrelated to employment and causes no tangible internal disruption within the workplace. 23
To illustrate why a modification of the current legal framework is necessary to respond to
an increase in social media based speech, Part I traces the inception of speech rights for public
employees and provides insight into the rationales that predicate the foundation for the current
framework depicting public employee' first amendment liberties 24 Part II discusses the
contemporary landscape of speech protection for govermnent employees. 25 Part III concentrates
on the shortcomings of the current framework in recognizing the first amendment values of offduty speech and the novel first amendment concerns social media speech presents. 26 Lastly, Part

19

See e.g. Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
See discussions, infra Part III.
21
See discussions, infra Part III.
22
See discussions, infra Part IV.
23
See discussions, infra Part IV.
24
See discussions, infra Part I.
25
See discussions, infra Part II.
26
See discussions, infra Part III.

20
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N reconciles social media speech with past treatment of off-duty speech and outlines a proposed

method of evaluating employees' off-duty social media speech. 27

PART 1: INCEPTION OF SPEECH PROTECTIONS FOR PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
The first and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution unequivocally
prohibit Congress and the states from enacting laws that abridge the freedom of speech of
citizens? 8 Nonetheless, this protection did not always apply to those citizens employed by the
goverrnnent. 29 As early as 1882, the Supreme Court held that convictions under section six of the
Act of August 16, 1976, which prohibited certain public employees from "requesting, giving to,
or receiving from, any other officer or employee of the goverrnnent any money or property or
other thing of value for political purpose ... " were constitutional. 30 Petitioner, Curtis, an
employee of the United States challenged the constitutionality of the Act after being indicted and
convicted under the Act. 31 A divided Supreme Court held the conviction constitutional, in favor
of the stated government interest to "promote efficiency and integrity in the discharge of official
duty and maintain proper discipline in the public service." 32
This line of thought evolved into the Holmesian model of speech rights, which was well
settled in the early twentieth century and afforded goverrnnent employees minimal speech
rights. 33 Under this view, accepting employment with the goverrnnent necessarily included a
partial suspension of the constitutional right to free speech. 34 Significantly, in McAuliffe v. City
ofNew Bedford, Justice Holmes upheld the termination of a police officer employed with the
27
28

See discussions, infra Part IV.

U.S. Cons!. amend. I, XIV.
Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,372 (1882).
30 !d.
31
Id. at 372.
32
!d. at 372.
33
See McAuliffe v. City of New Bedford, !55 Mass. 216,220 (Mass. 1892).
34
McAuliffe, !55 Mass. at 220
29
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City of New Bedford for violating a regulation that prohibited employees from soliciting money
or aid on any pretense for political pwpose. 35 Justice Holmes opined that the regulation,
abridging civil liberties as a term of employment was constitutional. 36 Justice Holmes accepted
this paradigm as reasonable in his illustrious statement, "[t]he petitioner may have a
constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." 37 The
Holmesian model placed government employers and private employers on equal footing,
allowing government employers the power to dismiss employees for exerting their first
amendment rights 38 Employees did not have a constitutional right to employment with the
government and thus it was permissible for government employers to proscribe terms of
employment, even were they are repugnant to first amendment liberties. 39
The Supreme Court rubberstamped this approach and continued to deprive public
employees of their speech rights, particularly in the context of political affiliation. In United

States v. Wurzbach, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act, which forbid congressmen or representatives from receiving money from federal
employees for the pwpose of supporting nomination for primary elections. 40
Similarly the Supreme Court in United Public Workers v. Mitchen upheld the Hatch
Act's prohibition on members of the federal executive branch participating in political
management or campaigns. 41 Unlike Justice Holmes in Wurzbach, the Supreme Court
acknowledged employees' first amendment interests in United Public Workers!2 Yet, the
Supreme Court concluded that the interest of orderly management of personnel outweighs
35

!d. at 219-220.
!d. at 220.
37
!d. at 220.
38
!d. at 220.
39
!d. at 220.
40
United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 296, 397 (1930).
41
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,78 (1947).
42
!d. at 94.
36
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individual employees' first amendment interests.

43

The Court also emphasized that federal

employees can still exercise their political expressive rights by voting at the ballot box.'4
The Holmesian paradigrn was well rooted as the Supreme Court examined cases dealing
with treasonable and seditious speech in the 1950's. In Adler v. Board ofEducation ofNew York,
the Supreme Court upheld New York's Civil Service Law which denied employment in public
schools to anyone who was a member of an organization advocating forceful overthrowing of the
government 45 Employees involved in such organizations were labeled unfit and as such, their
disqualification from employment on this basis was not an abridgement of first amendment
rights.' 6 The Supreme Court revisited Justice Holmes's dogma from McAuliffe, stating that it
"is ... clear that [public school employees] have no right to work for the State in the school system
on their own terms" as long as the State's terms are "reasonable." 47 In coming to this conclusion,
the Supreme Court emphasized the schools' need to screen employees to ensure continuing
operations and integrity in the school systems. 48 The Court also drew a parallelbetween
government employers and private employers, suggesting that both should have the same ability
to inquire into past conduct to determine fitness for a position, without posing first amendment
issues 49
Cases in the late 1950's and 1960's begin to deconstruct the Holmesian model and
forecasted the current framework for first amendment rights of government employees. In

Shelton v. Tucker, a divided Supreme Court invalidated a statute that required state schools and
college teachers to execute an annual affidavit disclosing all organizations they belonged to or

43

Id. at 94, 99.
Id. at 94, 99.
45
Adler v. Bd. ofEduc. of City ofNew York, 342 U.S. 485,485 (1952)
46
/d. at 493.
47
Id. at 492; see Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee Speech. 99 Nw. U. L. REV. I 007 (2005).
48
/d. at 493.
49
!d. at 493 (citing, Garnerv. Board of Public Works of Los Angeles, 341 U.S. 716,720 (1951)).
44
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contributed to regularly within the proceeding five years. 50 The Court recognized a legitimate
purpose in investigating the competence and fitness of school teachers. 5 1 However, the affidavit
required unlimited disclosure of past associations including associations that had no bearing on
the teacher's competence or fitness. 52 The statute and affidavit required disclosure of any church
the teacher belonged to, any organizations he supported financially, his political party, and any
other associational tie, whether it be social, professional, political, avocational or religious. 53 The
Supreme Court held that that the state's inquiry into the competency and fitness of its teachers
did not justify the substantial interference with the association freedom rights of the teachers. 54
In support, the Supreme Court cited to Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in

Weiman v. Updegraff, suggesting that the statute will inhibit freedom of thought and association
for teachers. 55 The Court reasoned that the statute put pressure on teachers to avoid any social or
associational ties that the school board disapproves. 56 Discharging teachers for associating with
"unpopular or minority organizations would simply operate to widen and aggravate the
impairments of constitutionalliberty." 57In contrast to the Holmesian model, the Court suggested
that employees do not always lose their first amendment rights upon accepting employment with
the government. 58

50

Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,480 (1960).
Id. at 488.
52
Id. at 488.
53
Id. at 488.
54
Id. at 490.
55
Id. at 487 (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)( Frankfurter, J. concurring)).
56
!d. at 486.
57
Id. at 486.
58
See. e.g, Keyishian v. Regents of the Univ. ofN.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 605-606(1967); see supra discussions, Part
Ill.
51
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PART II: CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF SPEECH PROTECTION FOR GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES

In 1968, the Supreme Court supplanted the Holmesian model in a watershed case,

Pickering v. Board ofEducation, which afforded public employees qualified freedom of speech
protection, in certain circumstances. 59 However, this seeming victory for employees' speech
rights was short lived. The Supreme Court's decision in Connick v. Myers and then in Garcetti v.
Ceballos swung the speech liberties pendulum back towards the restrictive Holmesian model 60
These three cases combined represent the current multi-tiered jurisprudence of speech protection
for government employees. Collectively, each case represents a categorical distinction that the
employee must fulfill in order to successfully assert a first amendment protection claim for any
adverse action on the basis of his or her speech.

A. Speech Pursuant to Official Duties is Unprotected
The first categorical distinction that determines if a government employee's speech is
protected within the purview of the first amendment lies in whether the speech is that of an
employee or a citizen. 61 The Supreme Court, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, categorized speech
pursuant to official work duties as beyond the scope of the first amendment. 62 Accordingly, if the
role of the speaker is of an employee acting pursuant to official duties, then the speech is
excluded from first amendment protection. 63 In contrast, if the speech is made by the employee's
capacity as a citizen, then it may be protected. 64 For the first time, the Supreme Court made a

59

Pickering v. Board of Education. 391 U.S. 563,572-573 (1968).
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,421 (2006).
61
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 410.
62
Id. at 421.
63
Id. at 422.
64
ld. at 422.
60
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bright line distinction based on the role of the speaker, which presents a significant narrowing for
government employees' first amendment rights. 65
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, Richard Ceballos was employed as a deputy attorney for the Los
Angeles County District Attorney's Office. 66 He wrote a memo criticizing misrepresentations
contained in an affidavit used to obtain a search warrant. 67 He ultimately brought suit asserting a
violation of his first amendillent speech rights because of alleged retaliatory actions he faced
after writing the memo. 68 The Supreme Court did not fmd such a violation. 69 Instead, the
majority recognized that writing memos advising his supervisor on how to proceed with pending
matters was in the ambit of Ceballos's duties as a deputy attorney?0 On this basis, the Court held
"that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are
not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate
their communication from employer discipline."71 Ceballos was speaking as an employee when
writing the memo because it was pursuant to his professional responsibilities. 72 Any retaliatory
action he faced because of the memo can be attributed to the control that an employer has over
evaluating the work product of its employees. 73 There is no judicial oversight over speech arising
from official work duties because the employee is not speaking as a citizen, who ordinarily has
first amendment rights. 74 Instead, when the speech is derivative of the public employer-employee
relationship, regulation of that speech is left to managerial discretion. 75

65

Id.
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70 Id.
71
Id.
72
!d.
73 ld.
74
!d.
75
!d.
66

at 413.
at414.
at 415.
at 421

at 422.
at 423.
at 422.
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The Supreme Court offered several other points in order to justify the rule it created in
Garcetti. It noted that government employees must accept certain limits on constitutional
liberties in favor of the government's interest in functioning efficiently. 76 The Supreme Court
also cited to the government speech doctrine and stated that restrictions on employee speech
reflect the overall control the agency has in commissioning its own mission. 77 Government
speech allows the government to inform citizens on issues enabling them to assess their
government's priorities and performance. 78 Garcetti reasons that if the public employee's speech
undermines the agency's mission, then the employer has discretion to discipline and no first
amendment claim arises. 79
The majority's holding in Garcetti was not free from criticism. The dissent criticized the
majority's failure to recognize that employees speaking on matters pursuant to official duty
should be valued because they are most informed about those issues. 80 Justice Stevens dissented
and argued that a government employer should not be able to discipline unwelcomed speech. 81
Instead, it should only be afforded the discretion to discipline inflammatory or misguided
speech. 82 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsberg dissented as well. Justice
Souter opined that the employee's interest in speaking on matters of official wrongdoing or
threats to health and safety can outweigh government interest in restricting the speech in favor of
efficient operations. 83 Whether or not the speech was pursuant to official duty should not be a

!d.
!d. at 421-422, see Rosenberg v. Rector & Visitor's of University of VA, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995).
78
Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government's Control of Its Workers' Speech to Protect Its
Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 21 (2009) (citing Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565,
606 (1980)).
79
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422; Norton, supra note 78, at 32.
80
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 430-431 (Souter, J. dissenting).
81
!d. at 425-426.
82
!d. at 425-426.
83
!d. at 428.
76
77
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consideration when employees are speaking on these matters. 84 Justice Souter ultimately
questioned the majority's reasoning in concluding that government efficiency justifies a
categorical exclusion of speech pursuant to official duty. 85

B. Speech Must be of Public Concern
Conversely, the first amendment is more protective of speech when a government
employee speaks as a citizen as opposed to pursuant to his official duties. 86 In this context, the
speech falls into the penumbra of first amendment protection if it relates to a matter of"public
concern." 87 In determining whether speech is of a public concern, judges make content based
determinations. 88 This is contrary to first amendment jurisprudence, which leaves citizens and
the market place of ideas to determine when speech is of public concern. 89
In Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court made a content based distinction as to a subset
of speech that is not of public concern. The Court held that a government employer is free to take
adverse action on the basis of speech relating to employee dissatisfaction or complaints over
internal office affairs because it is not of public concern. 90 In Connick, Sheila Myers was
terminated for soliciting a questionnaire to fellow employees about the "office transfer policy,
office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and
whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns." 91 The Supreme Court drew a
distinction between workplace disputes and matters relating to public concern, realizing that

84
85

/d. at 427.
/d. at 434.

86

d. at 422
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 (1983).
88
See Kozel, supra note 47, at 1996
89
See Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discn'mination Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of
the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 531 (1998).
90
Connick, 461 U.S. at 149
91
/d. at 141.
87
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"government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter." 92 The majority of Myers's questionnaire was not related to matters of public importance
because it was about internal office matters 93 Holistically, the questionnaire did not concern
"public import" in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney, its government
responsibilities, potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust. 94 Accordingly, the Court
reasoned that when the employee's speech does not substantially involve a matter of public
concern, the employer has liberal discretion to discipline the employee 95
In Connick, the Supreme Court also provided additional guidance on what constitutes

speech of public concern. Speech that relates to a matter of political, social or other concern to
the community is characterized as of public concern. 96 Determining whether the employee's
speech is of public concern also involves an examination into the content, form and context of
the speech, as revealed by the whole record. 97 The Supreme Court suggested that speech, which
assists the public in evaluating elected officials and disclosing breach of public trust will be of
public concern98
Connick also allows for tiers of content based protections. 99 Speech "upon matters only of
personal interest" is usually unprotected absent unusual circumstances. 100 Speech touching upon
public concern in a limited sense, such as employee grievances is unprotected when the
employer reasonably believes that it will disrupt the workplace. 101 Speech that involves
----~'M2 ~Jd&J43.______________________________________________________________________________
93

ld.
Id.
95
ld.
96
Id.
97
Id.

at 143.
at 148.
at !52
at 146.
at 147.
98
See Cynthia K.Y. Lee, Freedom of Speech in the Public Workplace: A Comment on the Public Concern
Requirement, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1109, 1117 (1988).
99
Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Government Employee, Are You A "Citizen"?: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the "Citizenship"
Prong to the Pickering/Connick Protected Speech Test. 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 589, 607 (2008).
100
See Rosenthal, supra, note 100 at 539.
101
See Rosenthal, supra, note I 00 at 539.

94
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substantive matters of public concern is protected when it does not disrupt the workplace. 102
Lastly, employees speaking as citizens on matters of general. concern have similar speech
liberties as any member of the public. 103
Justice Brennan did not agree with the Connick holding and dissented for several reasons.
Justice Brennan characterized Myers's entire questionnaire as speech of public concern. 104 He
stated that the questionnaire discussed topics that could "be of interest to persons seeking to
develop informed opinions" about the function of the government agency. 105 He opined that
Myers's questionnaire related to a matter of public concern because it was an effort to determine
the morale of the District Attorney's office. 106

In addition to leaving workplace grievances unprotected, the Supreme Court created a
second content based categorization of speech that is not of public concern in City ofSan Diego
v. Roe. 107 John Roe was a San Diego police officer who was terminated, in part, for selling

videos of himself stripping off a police uniform and masturbating on an online auction website,
eBay. 108 Roe also sold official San Diego Police Department equipment on his eBay user account
and indicated in his profile that he was employed in the field oflaw enforcement. 109 Roe's
supervisor discovered the website and the police department subsequently ordered him to cease
manufacturing and distributing sexually explicit material. 110 Roe partially complied and then was

102

See Rosenthal, supra, note I 00 at 539.
See Rosenthal, supra, note 100 at 539.
104
Connick, 461 U.S. at 161 (Brennan J. dissenting)
1os Id.
106 ld.
107
Kozel, supra note 47, at 1998
108
City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77,78 (2004)
109
Jd. at 78.
110
ld. at 79.
103
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terminated for violating the numerous department policies, such as, "conduct unbecoming of an
officer, outside employment and immoral conduct."

111

In determining whether his termination infringed his first amendment speech rights, the
Supreme Court concluded that Roe's expressions were not of public concern. 112 The Supreme
Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's reliance on Vnited States v. Treasury Employees in holding
that Roe's expressions were protected. 113 The. Ninth Circuit concluded that Roe's speech was
protected under the first amendment because it did not address a workplace grievance, the speech
was off-duty and had no bearing on Roe's employment. 114 The Supreme Court disagreed and
concluded that the speech was related to Roe's employment because he took "deliberate steps to
link the videos to his employment." 115 The Court emphasized that Roe listed that he was
employed in the law enforcement field, was stripping a police uniform in his video and also sold
San Diego Police Department equipment on the website. 116
The Supreme Court also stated that Roe's speech was not of public concern because it did
not inform the public on matters regarding the effective operations of the police department or
any other matters touching upon public concern. 117 In support, the Supreme Court offered that
expressions of public concern must address "something that is a subject of legitimate news
interest, that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of
the publication. 118 Thus, the termination did not violate Roe's first amendment rights because his

--·-··-----===========----------------111

!d. at 79.
!d. at 83
113
!d. at 79; United States v. Treasury Employees held that when employees speak on issues off duty and unrelated

112

to employment, the speech is protected undefthe first amendment unless the government's justification for
regulating it is "far stronger than mere speculation." 513 U.S. 454,465 (1995).
114
Roe. 543 U.S.at 81
115
!d. at 81.
116
!d. at 81.
117
!d. at 84.
118
!d. at 83.
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expressions did not address any subject of general interest, value or concern to the public. 119 Nor
did it inform the public about the functioning of the San Diego Police Department or touch upon

°

broader political issues. 12 Furthermore, according to the Court, Roe's speech expressions
interfered with the mission of the police department and jeopardized the professionalism of the
entire department. 121
Hence, a government employer is free to take adverse action based on speech that
possesses minimal social or political value. 122 Additionally, the government employer has
unlimited latitude in restricting speech concerning private matters that implicate employment,
but is not of public concern. 123 Courts will not question the government employers' motive in
regulating this speech even if it causes no disruption and may be of value to the speaker and
listener. 124 On the contrary, if the speech is substantially or inherently of public concern, then the
court applies the Pickering balancing test to determine whether it is ultimately protected speech,
with little employer deference. 125

C. Balancing of Employee and Employer Interests
If a court finds that a government employee's speech at issue is of public concern, then it
applies the Pickering balancing test to balance the employee's interest in speaking on a matter of
public concern with the employer's interest and justification for taking the adverse action against
the employee. 126 When an employee is speaking on matters of public concern, the government
employer's ability to regulate the speech does not differ significantly from its ability to regulate
119

See Rosenthal. supra. note 100 at 539.
See Roseothal. supra. note 100 at 539.
121
Roe, 543 U.S. at 81.
122
Id. at 84.
123
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674 (1994).
124
Jd.; see discussion, supra Part II.C.
125
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.2, 158 (1983).
126
Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 568 (1968).
120
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the speech of citizens. 127 Thus in order to regulate or take adverse action on the basis of an
employee's speech of public concern, the employer must establish that the speech in question
substantially interferes with the efficiency in discharging its own official duties and maintaining

. . 1me
. of empIoyees. 12s
proper dISCip
In Pickering, Marvin Pickering, a teacher, was terminated for sending a Ie:tter to a local
newspaper criticizing the Board of Education's allocation of funding between education and
athletic programs. 129 The letter also criticized the Board's reasoning for why additional school
funding was necessary and the way the Board's decided to inform tax payers of the increase. 130
Pickering was dismissed after the Board held a hearing, in which it concluded that the
"statements in the letter were false and that the publication of the statements unjustifiably
impugned the 'motives, honestly, integrity, truthfulness, responsibility and competence' of both
the Board and the school administration."

131

The Board further justified the termination by

asserting that the false statements damaged the professional reputation of the school and were
disruptive to faculty discipline. 132
The Supreme Court recognized the two divergent interests at stake. On the one hand,
Justice Marshall noted the importance of free and open debate to the informed decision making
process. 133 Government employees are in the best position to articulate informed opinions on
matters of public concern. 134 The Supreme Court also recognized the interest of the employer in
restricting employee speech in the name of efficiency. 135 Therefore, the Supreme Court crafted a
-------------- - -

Id.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 151 (quoting Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,373 (1982)).
129
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.

!27
128

!d.
!d.
132
!d.
133
!d.
134 !d.
135
!d.
130

131

at 566-567.
at 567.
at 571-572.
at 568.
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balancing test, which requires a "balance between the interest of the [employee] as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the state, as an employer, in
promoting the efficiency of public services it performs through its employees." 136
Returning to Pickering, the Court rejected the Board's underlying contention that the
letter had a detrimental impact on the school district's ability to function and that Pickering owed
a duty ofloyalty by virtue of his public employment to support his superiors which limits his
ability to publically speak on certain issues. 137 Further, the letter could not be the basis for
discipline because the Board did not furnish any evidence that the statements in the letter were
false and the letter did not affect Pickering's ability to teach. 138 Additionally, there was no
evidence that the letter interfered with the operations of the school. 139 After concluding that
Pickering's letter was a matter of public concern, the Court held that the Board's interest in
disciplining Pickering for the letter was no greater than if it the letter was written by a citizen. 140
The Court emphasized that teachers, like Pickering, are in a unique position and have the
ability to formulate informed opinions on how funding should be allocated between education
and athletic programs and should be able to speak on these matters without fear ofreprisal. 141
These are matters of public concern and unless the Board can show that Pickering knowingly
made false statements in the letter, his rights to speak on the matter of public concern cannot be
the basis for adverse action. 142
In subsequent cases following Pickering, the Supreme Court offered further guidance

with respect to the balancing inquiry a court must undertake if an employee's speech is found to
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be of public concern. First, Givhan clarified an aspect of Pickering's holding. Givhan held that
an employee's speech rights will not hinge on whether he or she communicated privately to the
employer versus openly to the public. 143 In Givhan, a school teacher spoke privately with the
principle about the school's discrimination practices and subsequently suffered adverse action on
the basis of the speech. 144 In a footnote, the Court suggested when the speech at issue is
relatively private the Pickering balancing test should encompass the content of the speech and
also the manner, time and place where it is delivered. 145 The Court's rationale suggests that it
requires the government employer to tolerate at least some internal critical speech on matters of
public concern. 146 However, the additional factors in the balancing allow the government to
protect against a situation in which the entire government agency's institutional efficiency may
be threatened based on private encounters an employee has with a supervisor. 147
Second, the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Rankin v. McPherson also clarified
several aspects of the Pickering balancing test and Connick's public concern requirement.
McPherson was a clerical employee for the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas and
was terminated for a statement she made during a private conversation with a fellow employee,
who happened to be her boyfriend. 148 In response to learning that someone attempted to
assassinate the president while discussing presidential administration policies, she said, "if they
go for him, I hope they get him." 149 In viewing the statement in context of the entire
conversation, the Court concluded that it was of public concern. 150 Upon applying the Pickering
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balancing test, the majority concluded that there was no evidence of McPherson's statement
interfering with operations of the employer. 151 The Court emphasized the position of the
employee and the level of responsibility afforded as a factor in the Pickering balancing test. 152
The Court suggested that if the employee serves no confidential policy making or public contact
role, then any interference with the agency's effective operations will be minimal. 153 As such,
any concern the employer has that the employee's speech may impact operations will be
attenuated and removed to justify discipline. 154
Justice Powell offered another outlook in concluding that McPherson's speech was
protected. He emphasized that the comment was made during a private conversation between
McPherson and her boyfriend and that she had no intention or expectation that it be overheard. 155
In such circumstances, the speech should be protected so long as it is of public concern. 156
Justice Powell reasoned that if the speech is of public concern, then it is unlikely that the
employer's legitimate interest will justify punishing the employee for regular private speech
occurring in the workplace. 157 The Pickering balancing test should not be required because it is
unlikely that a single private comment could disrupt the agency's operations. 158
The dissent argued that McPherson's speech was not a political hyperbole and should be
unprotected. 159 Instead her speech was on the border of unprotected speech and not at the heart
of first amendment protection. 160 The dissent contended that regardless of whether McPherson's
speech was of public concern, the government interest in restricting the speech outweighed her
151
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first amendment interests. 161 According to the dissent, law enforcement had an interest in
punishing such a violent statement, without having to show actual disruption or that the
statement implicated unfitness of the employee. 162 With respect to McPherson's statement, it
presented a risk to office operations because she did have telephone contact with the public. 163
The dissent disagreed with the majority, arguing that non-policy making employees can also
negatively impact operations of the office as well. 164
Furthermore, Waters v. Churchill clarifies the reasoning in Pickering and offers further
justification on why the govermuent as an employer is afforded broader discretion than the
govermuent as a sovereign in restricting speech. 165 The govermuent as an employer functions by
law to accomplish particular tasks. 166 To dispel these tasks efficiently, it hires employees. 167
These employees are paid a salary to contribute to the govermuent employer's operations and to
accomplish tasks effectively. 168 If the employees' activities and speech is detracting from the
employer's effective operation, it needs to be afforded restraining power. 169 Ultimately, "where
the govermuent is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving these goals,
such restrictions [of speech] may well be appropriate." 170
The majority in Connick used a similar justification when it redefined the Pickering
balancing test. The majority concluded that when the employee's speech does not substantially
involve a matter of public concern, the employer has discretion to discipline the employee
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without an actual manifestation of disruption in the workplace. 171 However, Waters broadened
this and stated that employers can take adverse action on the basis of speech upon on a
reasonable prediction of disruption, even when the speech is of public concern. 172 The
interference with operations does not have to be imminent or actua1. 173 Instead the employer can
take adverse action, when the government employees' speech affects moral in the workplace,
fosters disharmony, impedes the employee's own ability to perform duties, or obstructs
established close working relationships. 174

PART III: INADEQUACIES OF THE CURRENT SPEECH PROTECTION
FRAMEWORK

The current framework to determine whether a government employee's speech is
protected under the first amendment is inadequate to protect off-duty social media speech that is
unrelated to work. This can be attributed to the judicial weakening of the employee's civil
liberties and the unique characteristics of social media based speech. There are two main
criticisms and potential areas for reform in the current first amendment framework as applied to
off-duty speech protections. 175 The first is the issue of viewpoint discrimination, which allows
employers to make selective case-by-case judgments on what speech constitutes cause for
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discipline. 176 The second is the fact that no actual workplace disruption is required in order for
the employer to take adverse action on the basis of employee speech. 177
These two issues are interrelated and bestow upon government employers the authority to
use off-duty social media speech as the basis for discipline, even when it is not related to
work. 178 Case precedent gives employers the ability to do this even when the speech does not
pose a threat of interfering with the actual mission statement or operations of the employer. 179
Instead, employers can curtail speech when they do not agree with the content of the speech,
upon showing a potential for disruption.

°Collectively, these two problems enshrine the

18

heckler's veto 181 and create a chilling effect 182 on government employee's social media speech.
Both criticisms of the current framework for speech protection are further complicated
by the unique aspects of social media websites and their usage. There are innumerous social
media websites, each with different expressive and commutative features it offers. 183 As a result,
courts have difficulty determining what social media activity is speech under the first
amendment.

184

For example, Facebook, a popular social media networking website enables its

users to share and publish content in the form of statements, pictures, and videos with over 950
other million users. 185 Facebook features a "Like" button, which is depicted as a "thumb-up"
icon. 186 This "Like" button appears next to content on Facebook and allows users to "Like"
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various items. 187 By clicking the "Like" button, a user makes a connection to that content, and
also announces to the user's chosen audience that he or she "Likes" specific content or story. 188
In laymen terms, when a user clicks the "Like" button, "she is expressing an idea ... she is telling
other users something about who she is and what she likes." 189
Recently, a district court in Virginia addressed the issue of whether the action of clicking
the "Like" button on Facebook is protected speech under the first amendment. 190 In Bland v.
Roberts the court held that "Liking" a Facebook page is insufficient speech to merit
constitutional protection. 191 The court distinguished "Liking" a Facebook page versus Facebook
postings where actual statements are made. 192 In Bland, plaintiffs were employed by the
Hampton Sheriffs Office. 193 They expressed their support for one of the Sherriff s opponents in
an upcoming election and contended that they were terminated because of this. 194 Prior to the
election, the Sheriff became aware of two of the plaintiffs "Liking" the opponent's Facebook
page. 195 The court boldly concluded that "simply liking a Facebook page is insufficient. It is not
the kind of substantive statement that has previously warranted constitutional protection." 196
Aside from distinguishing between actual statements made on Facebook and the act of"Liking"
content on Facebook, the court did not offer an insight into its decision making process. 197
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A. Viewpoint Based Discrimination

A substantive criticism of the current employee speech protection framework is it allows
employers to make viewpoint discriminations based on the content of an employee's speech and
discipline accordingly. 198 This includes making content based determinations about an
employee's off-duty speech that is not related to work. 199 Connick allows employer to
discriminate based on the content of the employee's speech, a practice deemed unconstitutional

°

in first amendmentjurisprudence?0 Connick's holding that workplace grievances and
complaints are not of public concern, is a distinct content based judgment as to when speech
qualifies as of"public concern."201 In essence the Connick majority permits employers to make
case by case content based judgments about whether an employee's speech amounts to cause for
discharge on the basis of public concern, a type of judgment traditionally reserved for citizens
and the market place of ideas. 202
Notwithstanding, Connick allows for this, without providing a distinct framework as to
detennine what speech amounts to a matter of public concern and invites a variety of
interpretations?03 For example, in Rankin, a divided court concluded that McPherson's statement
was a matter of public concern. 204 The majority concluded that the statement was a matter of
public concern irrespective of the private nature of the statement and lack of contribution to
public discussion. 205 In contrast, Givhan held that private speech can be a matter of public
concern based on its content 206 Another inquiry focused on the intended audience of the speech,
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whether it was made off-duty and if it was related to the employee's job in determining if the
speech addressed matters of public concern. 207 On the other hand, Roe offered a restrictive
approach on the public concern inquiry. 208 According to Roe matters of public concern are
subjects "of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and
concern to the public at the time of publication."209 An alternate inquiry concluded that speech
made off-duty and unrelated to work is presumptively protected speech regardless of whether it
touches upon a matter of public conceru. 210
In Roe, the Court characterized Roe's off-duty speech as related to employment because
of the "deliberate steps" he took to reference his employment. 211 The Supreme Court also
suggested that Roe's off-duty speech became work-related because it undercut the overarching
mission of the Police Department and conveyed Roe's own unfitness for the job.Z 12 By recharacterizing Roe's off-duty speech as work-related in this matter, the Court expanded the
scope of"work-related." 213 The Court subsequently reject Roe's claim to first amendment
protection by concluding that his speech was not of public concern because it was not related to
.
vaIues or concerns important
to the publ'1c.214
Moreover, the Court also emphasized that Roe's expressions jeopardized the
professionalism of the entire department and the department's public image, because of his
deliberate and purposeful reference to his employment 215 This implies a focus on what Roe's
speech communicated about the police department as an institution and has no bearing on Roe's
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fitness as a police officer. 216 Hence, the Court suggested that Roe's off-duty speech is actually
work-related because it disseminates a message about the police department as a whole, which
the police department did not approve of. 217 Further, this analysis re-characterizes the speech as
work-related and gives the employer the ability to control the content of the speech if it does not
align with the employer's own interests or the public image it wants to maintain. 218
This is problematic because it vests employers with carte blanche discretion to suppress
virtually any and all employee speech, mindful that some nexus, however attenuated, could be
concocted by the employer to show "work" relationship. In essence, an employer is entitled to
abridge employee off-duty speech, by characterizing that speech as work-related when the
content of the speech presents a threat to the employer's own expressive interests as an
institution219 This development is far reaching compared to the general common sense
interpretation of work-related speech that previous courts utilized. 220 The common sense inquiry
is narrower with a focus on objective criterion, such as whether the speech referenced an internal
workplace grievance, issues related to employment, co-workers or supervisors?21 This narrow
inquiry does not take into account the content of the employee's speech and consequently does
not give employers the ability to make subjective content based determinations in order to
characterize off-duty speech as on-duty speech. 222
Lower courts have extended Roe's reasoning to allow employers to discipline employees
for off-duty speech even when it does not implicate employment in any manner. 223 For instance,
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The Ninth Circuit applied Roe's expansive scope of work-relatedness in Dible v. City of

Chandler. Ronald Dible was fired from his position with the Chandler Police Department when
the Police Department discovered that he was operating a website that contained sexually
explicit pictures and videos of his wife. 224 The website contained pictures of his wife in sexual
poses and partaking in sexual activities with Dible and other inanimate objects. 225 Upon
discovering the website, the Police Department placed Dible on administrative leave and ordered
him to cease all activity on the website. 226 In the meantime, the police chief investigated and
affirmed Dible's involvement with the website. 227
Thereafter, the Police Department terminated Dible for violating "the department's
regulation prohibiting its officers from bringing discredit to the city service."228 Dible appealed
his termination which resulted in an evidentiary hearing. 229 At the hearing, other officers stated
that they were ridiculed because of the website. 230 The police chief testified that he believed that
Dible's involvement with the website would negatively impact the department's ability to recruit
female officers. 231 Upon review, the court determined that Dible's speech was not related to
public concern and instead "simply vulgar aud indecent."232
Nonetheless, the court still balanced the interest of the Police Department to maintain an
efficient and effective workforce versus Dible's first amendment rights. 233 The court
acknowledged the defamation to officers and the impact on recruitment that Dible's website had
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on the Police Department 234 It ultimately concluded that the Police Department could terminate
Dible for his involvement with the website without violating his first amendment rights. 235 In
doing so, the court inherently broadened the scope of the work-relatedness inquiry because there
was no evidence of Dible taking any steps to associate his off-duty speech with his employment,
as in Roe. 236 Instead, the court suggested that the off-duty speech and expressions of employees
in the public eye are always subject to employer's scrutiny 237
In another case, the Palm Beach County Sherriff s Office terminated officers for
participating in sexual activity that was displayed in the form of photographs and videos on a
pay-per-view internet website. 238 Prior to the termination, an investigation revealed that the
employees did not associate their employment as officers on the website. 239 Nonetheless, their
superiors recommended termination and stated that they cannot "allow these men to blemish the
integrity, honor, and reputation of this fine agency and the men and women who serve onr
community."240 Ultimately, the court upheld the termination by concluding that the speech was
not of public concern and stated there was no need to engage in a balancing test. 241 In doing so,
the court allowed the employer to make a viewpoint discrimination regarding the content of the
officers' speech because it may harm the reputation of the Sheriffs Office. The court afforded
the Sheriffs Office the authority to terminate the officers and infringe on their first amendment
liberties because their off-duty expressions, which were unrelated to work, did not fit within the
department's public image.

234

ld. at 928-929.
ld.
236
ld. at 926.
237 Id.
238
Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriffs Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1356 (lith Cir. 2006).
239
ld. at 1345.
240
ld. at 1348.
241
Jd. at 1356.
235

-29-

Similarly, a police officer and two firefighters employed by the town of Broad Channel,
Queens were terminated for entering in a Labor Day parade float contest with a float negatively
depicting the African American community. 242 ln the past, the prize for the funniest float, which
the plaintiffs' were hoping to win, had been awarded to floats featuring racial and ethnic
stereotypes. 243 Plaintiffs had previously participated in these floats, without any issue.Z44
However, this time, the plaintiffs' float received extensive media attention, as newspapers ran
stories stating that according to "city officials," New York City police officers and firefighters
participated in the "Racist Float. " 245 All three plaintiffs were suspended without pay after their
participation in the float was confirmed and Mayor Giuliani was quoted stating that all three
would be terminated. 246
After administrative hearings, all three were indeed fired and subsequently filed suit
alleging a violation of their first amendment rights. 247 The district court concluded that their
participation in the float was protected speech, addressing a matter of public concern and that
they were improperly terminated "for the content of that speech ... " 248 However, on appeal, the
court found the terminations to be warranted and reasoned that the first amendment rights of the
individuals must yield to the employers' "interest in maintaining a relationship of trust between
the police and fire departments and the communities they service." 249 The court allowed the
employers' to restrict employee speech because it did not agree with the controversial content of
the parade float and was concerned about potential harm to its own public image. 250
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These three cases demonstrate the courts willingness to defer to the employer's
disciplinary actions by improperly categorizing employee off-duty speech that does not address
issues related to employment, as work-related. 251 By doing so, courts are validating employers'
contention that maintaining their own expressive interest and public image as an institution
trumps any individual employee's civilliberties.Z 52 There exists a trend of increased deference to
a government employer's judgment that the content of an employee's speech may imperil their
own public persona and thus regulation of the employee's speech is necessary. 253 This sort of
content based judgment is unconstitutional under traditional first amendment jurisprudence.

254

Yet, courts have no problem allowing the government as an employer to discipline employee
speech in this fashion. 255 In practice, this is akin to constitutionalizing the heckler's veto 256 ,
which is explicitly prohibited under traditional first amendment precedent.

257

Permitting this sort

of content based judgment also causes an overall chilling effect which Pickering recognized as it
noted, "the threat of dismissal from public employment is nonetheless a potent means of
. h"b"
. speec h .,258
m
1 1tmg
Social media based speech is especially vulnerable to this sort of content based judgmeut.
Under the common sense inquiry undertaken to determine whether speech is work-related prior
to Roe, social media speech will be labeled off-duty if it occurs beyond work hours and does not
address internal workplace concerns or the subject matter of employment. 259 In contrast, Roe and
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Dible's expansive work-related inquiry may treat off-duty social media speech unrelated to
employment as "work-related" based on the content of the speech. 260 It allows an employer to
Classify this speech as work-related if it undermines the overall mission of the employer.
By concluding that an employee's speech undermines the mission of the government
agency, a public employer is free to make a content- based distinction as to the value of the
employee's speech. If the employer decides that the employee's speech hinders the agency's
overall message, the employer is given broad deference to regulate this speech. Thus, it gives
employers a right to discipline employees for off-duty social media speech, even if
communicated on private social media profiles 261 Case precedent allow the employer to justify
the adverse action based on content of the speech by arguing that the employee's speech projects
a message about the employer as an agency that is contrary to the public image that the employer
wishes to maintain. 262 This trend has already emerged, as many employers are disciplining and
terminating employees based on the content of their social media speech which is unrelated to
work and presumptively off-duty speech.
For instance, Jerry Buell, a public school teacher in Florida was suspended for anti-gay
marriage postings on Facebook. 263 He made the comments after New York legalized same-sex
marriage. 264 The Facebook postings were made on his private profile from his personal
computer, while he was at home. 265 The teacher stated that he believed he was "exercising what
[he] believed as a social studies teacher to be [his] First Amendment rights."266 The school firmly
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stated that it has an obligation to take the connnents seriously and complete a thorough
investigation to see if the school's ethics code was violated. 267 According to the school, people
were sending screen shots of the teacher's Facebook profile in order to facilitate the
investigation, which could raise privacy concerns. 268 An attorney connnenting on the suspension
stated, "[a]ll he did was speak out on an issue of national importance and because his comments
did not fit a particular mold, he is now being investigated and could possibly lose his job. What
have we come to?"269
This instance also echoes the double standard between the off-duty social media speech
protection of teachers and students within public school districts. The Third Circuit recently held
that punishing a student for creating a MySpace profile making fun of her middle school
principal was in violation of her first amendment rights. 270 The profile contained vulgar and
sexually explicit content, but was still protected. 271 The court stated that another student
furnishing a hard copy printout of the MySpace profile page to the principal did not transform
the student's off-site speech into on-site speech272 Even with the double standard, the line may
not be so clear with Buell's suspension, as some members of the connnunity believed that gay
students may feel uncomfortable in his class, which may impact the school's operations and
efficiency. 273 However this belief was one-sided because many others created a Facebook group
to advocate for Buell's reinstatement. 274
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In another instance, Jeffery Cox, a Deputy Attorney General in Indiana was terminated
after Tweeting that police in Wisconsin should use "live ammunition" to handle pro-labor
protestors at the state's capito1. 275 He also called protestors "political enemies" and "thugs."276
Soon after Cox Tweeted the statements, his employment with the Indiana Attorney General was
discovered. 277 When a magazine, wrote to Cox , requesting context for some of the Tweets, he
explicitly disclaimed any associatiorial ties with the Indiana Attorney General's Office by
stating, "[a]ll my comments on twitter & my blog are my own and no one else's." Despite this, he
was terminated. 278 In an effort to justify the termination, the Indiana Attorney General released a
statement, "[c]ivility and courtesy toward all members of the public are very important to the
Indiana attorney general."279
Although the Attorney General recognized an individual's first amendment right to voice
personal views on an online forum off-duty, he stated " ... but as public servants, state employees
also should strive to conduct themselves with professionalism and appropriate decorum in their
interactions with the public. "280 This statement suggests that the Attorney General did not
consider that Cox's Tweets were made off-duty and were not associated with his employment.
Instead, it seems that Cox was terminated because the content of his Tweets was not professional
and inappropriate decorum in the eyes of his employer. This further resonates the problem of
viewpoint discrimination with off-duty social media speech because it allows employers to
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terminate employees, like Cox, for off-duty social media speech that is in purported conflict with
the public image of the employer.
Similarly, Math Blahut, a police officer, employed by the Washington State Patrol was
forced to resign because of his Facebook postings. 281 He was forced to resign for postings
pictures of him drinking beer and also a picture of himself at a party. 282 Elsewhere on his
Facebook profile, Blahut also displayed pictures of him in uniform, and pictures of him posing
next to his cruiser. 283 A member of the community saw the pictures while his daughter was
viewing the officer's private Facebook profile. 284 He brought them to the attention of the State
Patrol, who subsequently terminated Blahut because the pictures did not "present a good image
for the state patrol" and did "not show good judgment."285
His termination was the proximate result of the State Patrol making a judgment regarding
the content of the pictures. Blahut's first amendment liberties were abridged because the State
Patrol did not approve of his pictures depicting alcohol consumption and attending parties. This
determination blatantly ignores the fact that the pictures were posted on a private profile page,
during the employee's personal time and that there is nothing illegal about Blahut's alcohol
consumption. The termination also undermines any expectation of privacy the police officer had
in his private Facebook profile. Further, the Washington State Patrol's decision to take action
because a member of the community oversaw Blahut's pictures while his daughter was viewing
Blahut private Facebook page suggests that a public employee is always under the watchful eye
of his employer.
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Likewise, Ashley Payne, a school teacher was given the option of either resigning or
suspension when a parent complained about a picture she posted on Facebook. 286 It was a picture
of Payne holding a glass of wine in one hand and a glass of beer in the other. 287 The picture was
taken while she was on vacation in Europe. 288 Payne said she was baffled that a parent was able
to view the pictures because she purposely made her Facebook profile and pictures private to
public users. 289 To justify the constructive suspension, school officials claimed that teachers were
warned about "unacceptable online activities" and claimed that Payne's Facebook page
promoted alcohol use and contained profanity? 90 Like the case of the Washington State Patrol
Officer, Payne faced adverse action because her employer did not approve with the content of the
pictures. The ramifications of this sort of the employer judgment are far reaching. One wonders
if Ashley Payne or Math Blahut could have been terminated for posting a picture on their private
Facebook profile of an innocent champagne toast at a private event.
Making content based judgments to regulate employee off-duty speech, which is
unrelated to work, demonstrate the expansive reach of the implications of Roe and Dible's
majority as applied to social media speech. Even when an employee designates a limited
audience for his or her speech and expressions, he or she may nonetheless be subjected to
adverse action on the basis of that speech291 An employer can restrict and regulate employee
social media speech by subjectively concluding that the speech does conform to the mission
statement or public image of the employer.
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Further, a government agency can made impromptu decisions, even when there is no
established mission statement that the employee's speech allegedly undercuts. 293 In the absence
of an apparent conflict with a viewpoint of the agency, the employer can simply allege that the
social media speech of the employee is "conduct unbecoming" of the employee that "doesn't
present a good image" for the employer or "does not show good judgment."294 This reasoning
assumes that all unpopular or controversial messages will necessarily conflict with a government
agency's public image. 295 This analysis as applied to social media speech that is unrelated to
work implies that the employer is always allowed to control the content of the employee's
speech. The intended protections of the Connick-Pickering test are severely diminished, as
employers are permitted to "use authority over employees to silence discourse, not because it
hampers public functions, but simply because superiors disagree with the content of the
employees' speech."296

B. ACTUAL SHOWING OF DISRUPTION
In addition to making content based judgments of employee off-site speech, employers
are also permitted to regulate such speech absent a showing of actual disruption in the
workplace. 297 Judicial expansion of the Pickering balancing test weighs in favor of an
employer's ability to regulate the speech because no tangible showing of disruption or
interference with work operations is required. 298 In Pickering, the Supreme Court stated that an
actual showing of disruption is required to justify disciplining the employee for exercising his
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first amendment right to speech.Z 99 Pickering's speech was protected because the employer failed
to show that the letter, criticizing the allocation of school funding between educational and
athletic programs, "in any way .. .interfered with the regular operations of the school." 300
However, in Connick, the Court held that the employer need only show a reasonable
belief that the speech "would disrupt the office, undermine [ ] authority, or destroy close working
relationship" to justify adverse action on the basis of the speech. 301 Justice Brennan criticized the
majority's holding and argued that the majority erred in allowing unfounded fear of disruption in
the workplace to weigh in favor of the speech being unprotected. 302 He emphasized the lower
court's finding that Myers's questionnaire did not violate an established office policy or actually
disrupt the office atmosphere. 303 Justice Brennan recognized that restricting speech without a
showing of actual disruption will inherently deter employee speech critical of the employer, thus
depriving citizens of information regarding the performance of their elected officials. 304
Merely requiring a reasonable belief of disruption in the workplace is a subjective
standard that gives government employers the ability to make subjective decisions based on
speculative belief as to the disruptive impact of employee speech. 305 The Court in Connick was
quick to defer to the district attorney's concerns that Myers's questionnaire interfered with "the
efficient and successful operation of the office." 306 The Court did this despite the lower court's
determination that there was no actual showing that Myers's questionnaire negatively affected
her ability to perform work duties 307 Instead the Court relied solely on the employer's subjective
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belief that Myers's actions were an act of insubordination and had the potential of negatively
impacting close-working relationships of employees and supervisors. 308 Thus, absent an actual
showing of disruption, the Court granted deference to the employer's judgment in deciding when
to discipline the employee where the speech at issue had the potential to interfere with working
relationships. 309 The Court distinctly stated that "we do not see the necessity for an employer to
allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and destruction of working
relationships is manifested before taking action." 310
Subsequently, Waters also addressed the employer's burden in showing disruption for
terminating an employee based on his or her speech. Waters focused on whether the "potential
disruptiveness" of the employee's speech is enough to justify disciplinary action. 311 The Court
determined that the employer's perception that the employee's speech, if allowed to continue,
threatened to undermine the employer's authority dictated this inquiry. 312 A subsequent case
clarifying Waters stated that the government's burden is merely to show that the employee's
speech threatens to interfere with workplace operations and as such, no actual injury as a result
of the speech is required prior to discpline. 313
The Ninth Circuit in Dible also relied on Waters when it concluded that the employer met
its burden for justifying a termination. The employer's justification had to be more than "mere
speculation" but can still be premised on "reasonable predictions of disruption."314 The court
concluded that ifDible's involvement with the sexual explicit websites was to be known to the
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public, it would be detrimental to the mission and functions of the employer. 315 Thus, the court
suggests that the public's external negative perception of Dible's speech will suffice as a
showing of potential disruption to the employer's functions. 316 The potential disruption can be
based on the public's perception of the employee's speech, which is external to workplace
operations, and how public perception may affect overall the employer's operations. 317
The notion that no actual showing of disruption is required to justify an infringement of
first amendment rights coupled with an employer's latitude in making viewpoint discriminations
is problematic. It allows an employer to make content based judgments about the employee's
speech and then discipline the employee without a showing of actual disruption in the
workplace. 318 The employer can make such judgments when it believes that the employee's
speech interferes with the public image of the employer. 319 Further, the employer can use the
potential of external disruption to justifY disciplining employee speech. 320 Instead of focusing on
the impact of the speech within the workplace, employers can focus on external disruption as a
result of harm to public image. 321 Moreover, this external disruption can be speculative and
conjectural, and still suffice the employer's burden to justifY any termination. 322
The practical consequences of these two caveats are unnerving. They essentially create a
rule such that an employee "may be fired for engaging in expressive activities, unrelated to [his
or her] employment, when [members] of the public disapprove of the expression vigorously and
possibly disruptively." 323 It allows employers to use "disruption" attributable to the public's
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disapproval with the content of the employee's speech as the basis for discipline. 324 This rule
enables the heckler's veto and is inconsistent with first amendment jurisprudence. 325 Allowing
discipline based on content of the employee's off-duty speech could easily result in termination
for employees participating "in a Gay Pride parade, or expressive cross-dressing, or any number
of expressive activities that might fan the embers of antagonism smoldering in a part of the
population."326
This logic as applied to social media based speech, which is presumptively off-duty
speech, allows an employer to discipline the speaker even when there are no internal problems
with workplace operations. 327 A simple Facebook post or a Tweet can be the basis of an
employee's termination if the employer does not agree with the content and contends that it casts
the employer in a negative light. 328 The employer can simply state that it reasonably anticipates
public disapproval based on the content of the off-duty social media speech to justify regulating
the speech.
Consider the instance of a police officer from the City of Atlanta that was denied a
promotion for making the following Facebook post after an arrest: "Who would like to hear the
story of how I arrested a forgery perp at Best Buy only to find out later at the precinct that he
was the nephew of an Atlanta Police Investigator who stuck her ass in my case and obstructed it?
? Not to mention the fact that while he was in my custody, she took him into several other rooms
alone before I knew they were related. Who thinks this is unethical?" 329 Plaintiff made this
posting after an investigator who was related to the individual she arrested spoke with him and
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removed evidence from his pockets without Plaintiffs knowledge. 330 When the plaintiff brought
suit, the court concluded that the police department's interest in "maintaining unity and
discipline within the police force [ ] and in preserving public confidence in its abilities"
outweighed the plaintiffs first amendment rights in making the statement. 331 There was no actual
showing of disruption with workplace operations and the judiciary simply deferred to the police
department's interest in maintaining unity within the police force.
Correspondingly, Jerry Buell, Jeffery Cox, Math Blahut, and Ashley Payne all faced
adverse action for their social media speech because without a showing of actual internal
disruption in their workplaces. 332 Their employers took adverse action on the basis of off-duty
social media speech, encroaching on individual first amendment liberties, in response to negative
public disapproval of the speech. 333 Both Payne and Blahut lost their jobs because selected
members of the community found their legal alcohol consumption to be incongruous with their
employment as a teacher and police officer. 334
Buell and Cox also encountered a similar fate because the public did not agree with the
content of their views against gay rights and labor protests. 335 Granted with the case of Buell,
there is a possibility that his opposition to gay rights may cause any homosexual students in his
classroom to feel unconformable. 336 However this argument is attenuated as many students and
members of the community turned to Facebook to display their support for the suspended
teacher. 337 The argument is also moot because both Buell's and Cox's speech is of"a subject of
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general interest and of value and concern to the public."338 Suspending Buell for voicing views
on his personal time because a fraction of the community was hypercritical of them is
counterintuitive to first amendment principles. 339 Certainly, silencing Buell and Cox for their
seemingly unpopular speech with a pink slip is not what Justice Douglass meant when he wrote
that the function of freedom of speech "may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with ... or even stirs people to anger." 340
These cases exemplify how taking adverse action against employees for their off-duty
speech without a showing of substantive internal disturbance with workplace functioning acts as
to devitalize first amendment liberties. 341 Surely, this is not the result anticipated by a
jurisprudential spirit that would engage first amendment values to protect against the tyranny of
the government heavy handedness. 342 This practice runs contrary to first amendment values,
which are predicated on the notion that government may not regulate speech based on its content
or effect on listeners. 343
Another point of concern that complicates the quandary of viewpoint discrimination and
deference to the employer's prediction of disruption in the workplace is the reasonable
expectation of privacy an employee has in his or her social media speech. Generally, government
employees do enjoy an umbrella of privacy protection with regards to traditional off-site conduct
that is unrelated to work. 344 The employer cannot terminate employees for such conduct for the
sake of operational efficiency. 345 Instead the employer has to demonstrate a nexus between the
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employee's conduct and adverse impact on workplace functioning. 346 Conversely, under the first
amendment, off-duty social media speech that is unrelated to work is not analyzed under a
similar stringent framework. This signifies in a diminished expectation of privacy for employee
off-duty speech.
In addition, direct conflict exists between the expectations of privacy that employees and
employers maintain with respect to social media usage. Due to courts deference to employers'
judgments regarding viewpoint determioations and speculation of disruption in the workplace,
employers are able to evade employees' reasonable expectations of privacy in their social media
usage. 347 Increasiog regulation of social media speech seems to reflect the view that employees
should have limited or no expectations of privacy in their off-duty social media conduct. 348 It
also entails that courts and government employers do not fully recognize the first amendment
implications of social media speech. 349
On the contrary, a number of government employers have recognized the nuisances of
social media speech and responded with social media usage polices, governing both on-duty and
off-duty social media usage. 350 Some of these policies that govern the off-duty social media
usage speak to the diminished expectation of privacy afforded to employees. 351 Demonstratively,
the City of Chicago Police Department's social media usage policy depicting acceptable personal
use of social media states "[ d]epartment members are prohibited from posting, displaying, or
transmitting ... any communications that discredit or reflect poorly on the Department, its mission
346
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or goals." 352 Similarly, the City of Trenton's School Board also implemented a social media
policy, and advises employees that "their personal posts or photos can reflect back on the school
district or their job- that means no rants against the school district or photos of drunken
escapades." 353 These policies make it explicit to employees' that off-duty social media speech
will not be judged under a content neutral lens.
Many of these policies also advise employees to refrain from disclosing their
employment on their social media profiles. 354 This is a means to discourage the public from
associating the personal opinions of the employee with the official views of the employer. 355
Hence, in theory, an employee can include a disclosure on his or her social media profile,
effectuating the message, "the views and opinions listed on this profile are mine and do not
reflect that of my employer" to sever any and all association ties with the employer. Once an
employee does this, it should be difficult for an employer to argue that disciplining the employee
for his or her speech is necessary to protect the public image and mission of the employer. 356
However, it is unclear if an employer will give weight to an employee's attempt to disassociate
work-related ties in this manner. Cox, the Deputy Attorney General from Indiana was terminated
for his Tweets, despite stating that "[a)II my comments on twitter & my blog are my own and no
one else's. " 357
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PART IV: PROPOSED TREATMENT OF OFF-DUTY SOCIAL MEDIA SPEECH

As the previous parts illustrate, the contemporary scheme of employee speech rights is
restrictive and deferential to the employer. 358 It allows for government employers to discipline
employees' speech based on content and:subsequently allows speculated disruption instead of
actual disruption to justify regulation. 359 It empowers employers to regulate social media speech,
unrelated to work if it so "undermines" the employer's mission statement. 360 These deficiencies
to the current speech protection framework present additional first amendment problems when
applied to social media speech.
Social media allows for off-duty communications, which are essentially digital gettogethers or private conversations occurring in cyberspace. 361 Websites such as Facebook and
Twitter present the opportunity for users to instantly share their opinions with hundreds of users
with minimal effort. 362 They also allow users to stay connected with a close knit group of friends
or family and share private thoughts with them, like how their day was or their views on a
worthy news item. 363 Many social media networks also allow users to express themselves
through symbolic speech, such as "liking" a Facebook page or "following" another user on
Twitter. 364 Social media outlets also amplify a user's ability to disseminate their opinions
instantly to a designated audience of their choice. 365 The current anemic standards for speech
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protection allow government employers to take these seemingly private, non-work related
interactions and make them the basis for termination or discipline. 366
As a threshold issue, Bland's holding which distinguishes "Liking" a Facebook page and
Facebook postings narrows the spectrum of what social media activity constitutes "speech." 367

Bland concluded that "Liking" a Facebook page does not invoke first amendment values because
it does not involve making actual statements, as compared to making a Facebook post. 368 By
extending the logic behind the court's holding in Bland, other social media activity that does not
consist of actual statements may not be protected on the grounds that the expression falls outside
the first amendment. This can include a wide variety of activity such as following users on
Twitter369 or adding users as "friends" on Facebook370 or other social media sites. The
implications of Bland are significant, and apt to further erode speech protective values.
Thus, in theory a public employer is free to take adverse action on the basis of social
media speech that does not consist of making statements, for purely subjective and arbitrary
reasons, without any showing of disruption in the workplace. 371 This notion devalues social
media as a medium for speech because case precedent protects expressions analogous to
"Liking" a Facebook page when they are articulated without the use of social media. 372 This is
also in imminent conflict with the Supreme Court's case precedent governing symbolic speech,
which protected acts such as burning the American flag and wearing arm bands to school
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because these acts express a specific view and are symbolic, which in tum invoke the first
amendment. 373
Courts should treat social media expressive activity as equivalent to symbolic speech and
recognize it as speech for first amendment purposes. 374 As Facebook emphasizes in its amicus

curiae brief filled in Bland, "Liking" a political campaign Face book page is akin to placing a
campaign sign in your front yard, which is unequivocally protected under the first amendment. 375
The act is a form of symbolic speech that literally states to others that the user likes something
and wants to share this support or approval with the Facebook community 376 Ergo, "liking"
content on Facebook should be protected for the same reasons campaign signs placed in yards
are protected-the act provides information about the speaker's identity and is a convenient form
of communication for people of modest means. 377 Courts should presume that expressive social
media activity that does not involve making actual statements is nonetheless "speech" for first
amendment purposes because of its parallels to symbolic speech. 378
To further protect employees' substantive first amendment values, I first propose that
social media speech that occurs off-site and is unrelated to work should rarely be the basis for
any sort of employee disciplinary action in the workplace. No public concern analysis should be
applied to this sort of speech, thus stripping an employer of the discretion to make viewpoint
judgments about off-duty speech379 Social media speech such as Facebook postings and Tweets
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will necessarily be off-duty speech unless the employee makes such postings during work
hours. 380 These postings should also be deemed off-duty under a common sense worked-related
inquiry which looks to whether or not the speech addresses a subject matter of the employee's
govermnent employment, workplace affairs or disputes with supervisors. 381 As compared to the
work-relatedness inquiry in Roe, the common sense inquiry is narrow and focuses on objective
criteria. This proposed narrow work-related inquiry will not give employers the discretion to
make content judgments to characterize off-duty speech as work-related using Roe's extensive
inquiry. 382
Judge Canby's concurrence in Dible offers a meaningful way to differentiate between an
employee's on-duty and off-duty speech to determine whether the speech should be protected. I
propose a framework similar to Judge Canby's treatment of off-duty speech that is unrelated to
work to address social media speech based expressive rights of government employees. Recall in
Dible, the website at issue was unrelated to Dible's employment as a police officer. 383 He did not
take any steps to reveal his identity and employment with the police department through the
websiteJ 84 Because Dible's speech was unrelated to his employment, Justice Canby suggests that
the public concern requirement should be irrelevant in determining whether the speech is
protected under the first amendmentJ 85 He asserts that speech unrelated to employment,
occurring outside of the workplace and directed to the public should ipso facto be a matter of
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public concern. 386 Thus, no public concern inquiry is necessary when evaluating speech that
occurs outside of work and is unrelated to employment. 387
Courts should adopt this framework when analyzing speech claims arising from social
media speech that is not related to work and refrain from applying the public concern test. Prior
case law and the Supreme Court's own precedent suggest that the threshold application of a
public concern test was not intended to apply to this subset of speech. 388 The public concern test
helps identify speech "by an employee speaking as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest." 389 When a person speaks as a citizen and not as an employee, the public concern test is
irrelevant because its purpose is only to identify speech by employees "upon matters only of
personal interest." 390 The public concern test is more suited to apply when an employee makes
statements at work or related to work. 391 In such cases, the public concern test helps distinguish
whether the speech addresses issues related to work or deals with employee grievances. 392
Accordingly, if the employee's speech is not a grievance, then "it makes little sense to
ask whether the speech is of public concern." 393 Some courts recognize that the public concern
analysis does not squarely apply to off-duty speech that is unrelated to work because the public
concern test was developed to address on-the-job expressive activityJ 94 Bypassing the public
concern test for off-duty speech that is unrelated to work also serves the duel function of
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narrowing Roe's expansive work-related speech inquiry test and returning to a common sense
interpretation ofwork-related 395
Second, I propose that when an employer seeks to regulate an employee's off-duty social
media speech that is work-related under the narrow common sense inquiry, an overt modicum of
interference in internal workplace operations should be req\Iired. Under a narrow inquiry of
work-related, the off-duty speech must reference internal office affairs, the employee's own
employment statns or otherwise implicate the employer. 396 In order to regulate this speech, the
employer must establish that harm caused by the employee's speech was "real, not merely
conjectural."397 To ensure the utmost protection for employee's social media speech as afforded
under the first amendment, the employer should bear a heavy burden to show that the harm
caused by the speech is internal and not dependent on personal or public disapproval of the
speech. Case law prior to the judicial weakening of this burden serves as a guideline on what will
suffice to show aetna! internal disruption.
For instance, in Berger v. Battaglia, the court held that a showing of disruption based on
public reaction to a police officer's performance impersonating the late singer AI Jolson in blackface did not justify abridging the officer's first amendment liberties by ordering him to cease
performing. 398 The court characterized Berger's off-duty speech as protected and valued the
same as political speech or speech relating to social debate 399 Judge Phillips explicitly stated that
allowing public disapproval to justify the termination is comparable to advancing the heckler's
veto, which is unconstitutional under first amendmentjurisprudence. 400 Thus, the police
department needed something beyond the public's disapproval of Berger's performance to
395
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muzzle his first amendment speech rights. 401 In lieu of public disapproval, the police department
had to show that the speech impacted the department's ability to perform its duties effectively
and efficiently. 402
Judge Canby in Dible memorializes Judge Phillips's reasoning and states that the finding
of interference cannot be based on the notion that some people may think less of the employer,
which may somehow inhibit the employer's functioning. 403 Judge Canby proposes a rule that
"protects off-duty speech unrelated to employment when the speech itself causes no internal
harm, and the only disruption is in the external relations between the [employer] and the public
unhappy with the [employee's] expression."404 Adopting this rule entails that the employer will
not be able to make content based discriminations based on perceived public disapproval of the
content of the employee's social media speech. 405
Courts should adopt Judge Canby's reasoning when addressing first amendment claims
with respect to social media speech to restructure the balancing equilibrium in favor of employee
speech rights. Hence, if an employer wishes to discipline an employee based on his or her social
media speech that is not related to work, the employer must demonstrate tangible disruption
within the workplace. 406 The employer must present evidence of actual internal disruption to
operations such as: problems with disciplining, disharmony or interference with close working
relationship, or negative impact on performance. 407 Additional considerations to determine
whether an actual disruption within the workplace exists are factors whether the speech was
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private; whether the employee intended or expected the speech to remain private; the manner,
time and place where it was delivered; and the role and duties of the employee 408
Above all, the employer cannot use external disruption based on public relations to show
interference with operations in order to discipline social media speech. 409 An employer cannot
discipline social media speech because the public is offended and as a result, may not cooperate
with the employer in the future. 410
An example of how this proposed framework plays out practically is illustrated by the
termination of Andrew Shirvell, an assistant attorney general in Michigan. 411 On his blog,
Shirvell, accused the openly gay student body president of the University of Michigan for "antiChristian behavior" and called the student body president "[s]atan's representative on the student
assembly."412 Despite public upheaval, the Attorney General, Mike Cox did not take disciplinary
action, stating that the speech is "after-hours and protected by the First Amendment." 413 Cox also
corrected the Governor, who posted to Twitter stating that she would have fired Shirvel1.414 Cox
remarked, "I don't know why she's so freaking irresponsible ... she went to Harvard Law
School...[t]he civil service rules are a huge shield for free speech and she knows that." 415
Cox only suspended Shirvell after he engaged in harassing and stalking-like behavior and
also made additional blog postings during work time. 416 In this instance, the government
employer was cognizant of the employee's off-duty first amendment rights and did not attempt to
408
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regulate off-duty speech based on content or public disapproval. Instead, the employer only
disciplined the employee for engaging in the speech during work hours, which makes it workrelated under a narrow common sense inquiry. 417 The employee's speech was also accompanied
by potentially criminal chargeable stalking and harassing. 418 Cox's handling of Shive II' s speech
exemplifies my proposed treatment of off-duty special media speech in practice. Employers
should not discipline employee off-duty social niedia speech based on its content and the public
disapproval's of the speech.
Holistically, my proposed framework protects an employee's social media speech from
being subject to the heckler's veto, because a showing of internal disruption within the
workplace will be prerequisite before the employer is justified in disciplining the employee for
the speech. 419 This notion embodies the long standing principle that speech does not lose first
amendment protection because society fmds it offensive or distasteful. 420 Thus, external
disapproval from the public should not be sufficient to curtail the employee's interest in
exercising his or her first amendment rights. This framework protects employees from having
their constitutional liberties in the hands of the public's personal objection. 421 It also returns the
focus of balancing test on the employees' right to engage in the speech and bears no emphasis on
the value of the speech itself. 422 Further, this framework gives employees a basis to predict when
their social media based speech may become the basis for termination-when it is related to
work and causes a substantial disruption of working operations.
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CONCLUSION
Although cases in the 1950's and 1960's forecasted a comprehensive speech protection
regime for government employees, subsequent case law developments seem to restrict the scope
offrrst amendment values back to the Holmesian era. 423 Extensive deference to an employer's
ability to discipline off-duty social media speech bearing no relation to employment conveys the
impression that the government, as an employer, is free to abridge employee speech as a term of
employment. 424 To competently protect a public employee's first amendment values, courts
should refrain from allowing employer's to discipline off-duty employee social speech based on
its content. 425 Further, if an employee's social media speech is made while at work or implicates
employment under a narrow common sense inquiry, courts should not submit to employers'
speculative belief as to any potential harm the speech may cause. 426 Instead, courts should
require employers to demonstrate that the employee's speech causes tangible internal workplace
disruption. 427 Lastly, courts should acknowledge the similarities between expressive social media
speech and symbolic speech and accord the former with the same frrst amendment protection as
the later. 428
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